The Impact of Autism Spectrum Disorder and Alexithymia on Judgments of Moral Acceptability by Brewer, R et al.
The Impact of Autism Spectrum Disorder and Alexithymia on Judgments
of Moral Acceptability
Rebecca Brewer
King’s College London
Abigail A. Marsh
Georgetown University
Caroline Catmur
University of Surrey
Elise M. Cardinale
Georgetown University
Sarah Stoycos
University of Southern California
Richard Cook
City University London
Geoffrey Bird
King’s College London and University College London
One’s own emotional response toward a hypothetical action can influence judgments of its moral
acceptability. Some individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) exhibit atypical emotional pro-
cessing, and moral judgments. Research suggests, however, that emotional deficits in ASD are due to
co-occurring alexithymia, meaning atypical moral judgments in ASD may be due to alexithymia also.
Individuals with and without ASD (matched for alexithymia) judged the moral acceptability of emotion-
evoking statements and identified the emotion evoked. Moral acceptability judgments were predicted by
alexithymia. Crucially, however, this relationship held only for individuals without ASD. While ASD
diagnostic status did not directly predict either judgment, those with ASD did not base their moral
acceptability judgments on emotional information. Findings are consistent with evidence demonstrating
that decision-making is less subject to emotional biases in those with ASD.
General Scientific Summary
This study suggests that typical people base their judgments of the moral acceptability of behavior
on their emotional response to that behavior. People with autism spectrum disorder do not seem to
use emotional information and may rely more on rules to judge moral acceptability.
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Moral reasoning plays a critical role in human societies, resting
upon moral principles that prescribe how individuals ought to
behave. Individual differences in moral ideology may lead to the
adoption of different moral principles, however, with subsequent
impact upon moral reasoning. For example, individuals may be
more concerned with the moral acceptability of behavior that is
undertaken (deontologists), or with the consequences of that be-
havior (utilitarians/consequentialists). Philosophers have debated
the role of emotions in moral reasoning; although some argue that
morality is a purely rational process, based upon deliberative
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reasoning (Cudworth, 1996; Kant, 1785/1965), others emphasize
the role of emotions (Hume, 1777/1960; Prinz, 2004). It is now
generally accepted that both emotional and rational processes
contribute to moral decision-making (Cushman, Young, & Greene,
2010; Ugazio, Lamm, & Singer, 2012). The dual-process model of
morality (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001;
Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004) posits that
individuals attend to their own emotional response toward engag-
ing in different behaviors, as well as deliberating upon the out-
comes of these behaviors, to judge their moral acceptability.
Consistent with emotions being involved in moral decision-
making, automatic emotional reactions to victims’ emotional states
influence moral judgments (Haidt, 2001), and lead to condemnation
of moral violations (Decety & Cacioppo, 2012; Pizarro, 2000). Aver-
sive emotional reactions to such behaviors lead to a judgment that any
deliberate action causing distress is immoral (Avramova & Inbar,
2013; Haidt, 2001). Thus, emotional responses to immoral behavior
may arise through two routes; direct emotional response to the be-
havior itself, and empathic reaction to the distress the behavior elicits
in its victim (Miller & Cushman, 2013; Pizarro, 2000). Neurological
evidence also suggests that moral reasoning recruits brain regions
involved in empathy and emotion recognition in oneself and others
(Bzdok et al., 2012; Greene, 2003; Moll et al., 2002). Conditions
associated with impaired recognition of one’s own emotions may also
be associated with atypical moral acceptability judgments, therefore.
Crucially, the degree to which impaired recognition of one’s own
emotion affects moral reasoning should depend on the degree to
which one relies on emotional versus deliberative reasoning when
making moral judgments.
Alexithymia is a subclinical trait associated with difficulties
identifying and describing one’s own emotions (Nemiah, Frey-
berger, & Sifneos, 1976). Consistent with a role for the identifi-
cation of one’s own emotion during moral reasoning, increased
alexithymia is associated with more utilitarian decision-making
(Patil & Silani, 2014b), and increased perceived permissibility of
accidentally harming others (Patil & Silani, 2014a). Decreased
ability to recognize emotions in oneself therefore affects moral
decisions, in line with the dual-process theory of morality (Greene
et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2004).
It is widely reported that individuals with autism spectrum
disorder (ASD) exhibit difficulties recognizing their own emotions
(Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 2004; Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt, & Kotro-
nopoulou, 2007), and empathizing with others (e.g., Baron-Cohen
& Wheelwright, 2004), suggesting moral reasoning impairments
should also be a feature of ASD. Evidence for atypical moral
judgments in ASD populations is mixed, however (Gleichgerrcht
et al., 2013; Moran et al., 2011; Li, Zhu, & Gummerum, 2014;
Schneider et al., 2013; Zalla, Barlassina, Buon, & Leboyer, 2011).
Co-occurring alexithymia in ASD may explain this inconsistency.
Alexithymia characterizes under 10% of the typical population, but
approximately 50% of the ASD population (Berthoz & Hill, 2005;
Hill et al., 2004). Alexithymia and ASD are distinct, however; alex-
ithymia is neither necessary nor sufficient for an ASD diagnosis, nor
is it universal among individuals with ASD. Similarly, co-occurring
alexithymia is not specific to ASD; numerous clinical populations
(e.g., eating disorders, panic disorder and substance abuse; Grynberg
et al., 2012) also co-occur with alexithymia. Recent research demon-
strates that, where observed, empathy deficits and emotion recogni-
tion impairments in ASD are explained by co-occurring alexithymia,
not ASD per se (Bird et al., 2010; Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013;
Heaton et al., 2012; Bird & Cook, 2013). Given these findings, and
the contribution of emotional identification and empathy to moral
reasoning, it is possible that the atypical moral reasoning observed in
some individuals with ASD is a product of alexithymia and unrelated
to ASD itself. The current study tested this hypothesis, investigating
the separate contribution of alexithymia and ASD symptom severity
to moral judgments.
Method
Participants
Twenty-five individuals (six female) with, and 22 individuals (five
female) without a diagnosis of ASD participated in this study.
Twenty-four typical individuals initially participated, but two were
removed to match the groups according to alexithymia, measured by
the Toronto Alexithymia Questionnaire (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, &
Taylor, 1994), t(45)  1.56, p  .128, 95% confidence interval (CI)
[14.32, 1.88] (control M  50.14, SD  16.03; ASD M  56.36,
SD  10.30). The TAS-20 has high reliability and validity (Parker,
Taylor, & Bagby, 2003) and includes items such as “I am often
confused about what emotion I am feeling” and “It is difficult for me
to find the right words for my feelings,” answered on a scale from 1
(does not describe me well) to 5 (describes me very well). The ASD
and control groups were also matched according to age, t(45) .885,
p .381, d .53, 95% CI [10.64,4.14] (control M 31.27, SD
12.16; ASD M 34.52, SD 12.88), gender, 2(1) .01, p .918,
and IQ, measured using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelli-
gence (Wechsler, 1999), t(45)  .061, p  .951, 95% CI
[10.04,9.45] (control M 106.86, SD 16.20; ASD M 107.16,
SD  16.85).
The Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheel-
wright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) assessed ASD symptom
severity in all participants. AQ scores were significantly higher in
the ASD (M 26.63, SD 11.68) than control group (M 18.85,
SD 8.60), t(45) 3.36, p .002, 95% CI [14.83, 3.72]. Current
functioning of all individuals in the ASD group was assessed with
the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) Module 4
(Lord et al., 2000). ADOS scores meeting criteria for ASD may be
categorized as indicative of either autism or autism spectrum. Of
the 25 participants with a clinical diagnosis of ASD (assessed by
independent clinicians, according to DSM–IV criteria), 21 also met
the ADOS criteria for ASD (13 for autism, eight for autism
spectrum). Although four of the individuals in the ASD group did
not meet criteria for ASD according to the ADOS, they received
diagnoses from independent clinicians and scored above cut-off
for autism on the AQ. These individuals were included in the
reported analyses but were not outliers on any analysis, and their
exclusion did not alter the pattern of results.
Procedure
A previously validated task assessed moral judgments (Marsh &
Cardinale, 2012). Participants viewed 100 emotive statements,
equally divided into those evoking happiness, sadness, fear, dis-
gust, and anger. Statements include “I bought you a present”
(happiness), “I do not want to be friends any more” (sadness), “I
could easily hurt you” (fear), “I never wash my hands” (disgust),
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and “I broke your phone on purpose” (anger). Each statement was
presented once, with order randomized across participants. Partic-
ipants were required to rate the moral acceptability of saying each
statement to another person, ranging from 1 (never acceptable) to
4 (always acceptable). Ability to identify the evoked emotion was
assessed by presenting the same statements in a random order, and
requiring participants to identify their own emotional response to
each statement, from happiness, sadness, disgust, anger, and fear.
Five moral acceptability scores were calculated for each partic-
ipant by taking the mean rating for each of the emotion-inducing
categories. A Global Morality score, where higher scores indicate
more severe difficulties in judging moral acceptability, was calcu-
lated by taking the mean moral acceptability scores for the five
statement types, with happiness acceptability ratings reverse-
scored.
When assessing identification of emotion, scores were assessed
with respect to the typical validation sample reported in Marsh and
Cardinale (2012). An “error” score indexed the frequency with which
participants selected an atypical emotion, whereby increasing values
indicate less typical performance, using the following equation.
Error Score   (Number of Correct Responses
 Perfect Performance)2
Perfect performance was 20 responses of the statement emotion,
and zero responses of all other emotions.
Data Analysis
T Tests determined whether the ASD and alexithymia-matched
control groups differed in Global Morality score. Correlation analyses
determined the relationship between ASD symptom severity, alex-
ithymia, and moral acceptability judgments, in the full sample, and the
ASD and control groups separately. Fisher’s r-to-z transformations
compared the correlation coefficients in the two groups. Hierarchical
regression analyses (conducted separately in the control and ASD
groups) determined whether alexithymia or ASD symptom severity
predicted moral acceptability judgments once age, gender, depression,
and anxiety were controlled for, and whether each could predict the
dependent variables after the other was controlled for. It is necessary
to perform hierarchical regressions with alexithymia and ASD symp-
tom severity entered in both possible orders to independently inves-
tigate the effect of each, after controlling for the other, because of
colinearity. Analyses that do, and do not, control for alexithymia
when assessing the impact of ASD (and vice versa) allow for the
potential overlap in measures of each construct to be accounted for. If
the AQ (a putative measure of ASD symptom severity) also taps into
some features of alexithymia, controlling for alexithymia when as-
sessing the impact of ASD using the AQ will provide a more “pure”
measure of ASD traits, unconfounded by alexithymia. If alexithymia
is a feature of ASD (which we suggest is incorrect), however, then the
above analyses using raw AQ scores without controlling for alexithy-
mia would be judged to be more appropriate. A regression analysis
determined whether ASD group moderated the relationship between
alexithymia and moral judgments. Finally, the extent to which emo-
tional identification predicted moral acceptability judgments was in-
vestigated in each group using correlation analyses.
Results
The ASD (M  1.79, SD  .45) and alexithymia-matched control
groups (M 1.92, SD .58) did not differ in Global Morality score,
t(45)  .850, p  .400, 95% CI [.17, .43], or individual morality
scores (see Table 1). Global Morality score was uncorrelated with
ASD symptom severity, measured by AQ, r  .220, p  .137, but
was significantly related to alexithymia, r  .391, p  .007. No
morality score for the individual emotional categories correlated sig-
nificantly with ASD symptom severity, while alexithymia signifi-
cantly predicted morality judgments of statements eliciting happiness,
r  .377, p  .009, fear, r  .390, p  .007 and anger, r  .390,
p .007. Correlations between moral acceptability judgments for the
different statement types are shown in Table 2, for the full sample and
the control and ASD groups separately.
To determine whether the relationship between alexithymia and
moral acceptability ratings varies across the ASD and control
groups, correlational analyses were conducted in the groups sep-
arately. Alexithymia correlated significantly with Global Morality
score in the control sample, r  .716, p  .001, but not the ASD
sample, r  .053, p  .802. A Fisher’s r-to-z transformation
indicated that the two correlations differed significantly from each
other (Z  3.04, p  .002). Alexithymia was also significantly
associated with moral acceptability judgments for all statement
types in the control group (see Figure 1), but not with moral
acceptability judgments for any of the emotion categories in the
ASD group.
Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted separately in
the ASD and control groups. In the control group, alexithymia
significantly predicted Global Morality judgments over and above
age, gender, depression, and anxiety, regardless of the order alex-
ithymia and ASD symptom severity were entered into the regres-
sion model (see Table 3), whereas ASD symptom severity did not
significantly predict Global Morality when alexithymia was also
included in the model. In the ASD group, neither alexithymia nor
ASD symptom severity predicted Global Morality.
Linear regression, with the independent variables alexithymia,
ASD group, and their interaction term (Alexithymia  ASD
Group), determined whether ASD group moderated the relation-
ship between alexithymia and moral acceptability judgments. Al-
though alexithymia was (  .311, t  2.237, p  .031) and ASD
group was not (  .203, t  1.565, p  .125) a significant
predictor of global morality score, the interaction term signifi-
cantly predicted morality judgments ( .361, t2.673, p
.011). ASD group therefore moderated the effect of alexithymia on
moral acceptability judgments.
Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and t Test for Group Difference
for Moral Acceptability Judgments for the Individual
Statement Types
Statement type Control, mean (SD) ASD, mean (SD) t(40) p
Happiness 3.22 (.89) 3.50 (.60) 1.20 .237
Sadness 2.34 (.52) 2.14 (.65) .539 .593
Disgust 2.02 (.58) 1.99 (.72) .154 .878
Anger 1.88 (.71) 1.80 (.66) .345 .732
Fear 1.85 (.68) 1.69 (.41) .888 .381
Note. ASD  autism spectrum disorder.
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Finally, correlation analyses compared the relationship between
emotion identification typicality and moral acceptability judg-
ments in each group. In the control group, emotion identification
scores correlated with Global Morality scores, r  .741, p  .001,
whereas these scores were not correlated in the ASD group, r 
.093, p  .657. A Fisher’s r-to-z transformation indicated that the
relationship was significantly stronger in the control than ASD
group (Z  2.74, p  .003).
Discussion
It is widely suggested that both deliberative reasoning and emo-
tional responses contribute to judgments concerning the moral accept-
ability of behavior. If emotions shape moral judgments, impairments
identifying one’s own emotional responses, such as in alexithymia,
may cause atypical moral acceptability judgments (Patil & Silani,
2014a, 2014b), with the degree to which emotion identification im-
pacts upon moral reasoning, dependant upon the relative influence of
deliberative reasoning and emotional processes. We tested the hypoth-
esis that alexithymia, rather than ASD per se, is related to moral
judgments through its impact upon emotion identification. The hy-
pothesis was partly supported; although ASD did not affect judgments
of moral acceptability, it moderated the relationship between alex-
ithymia and these judgments.
In typical individuals, alexithymia was associated with atypical
moral acceptability judgments. Individuals with more severe alexithy-
mia considered it less acceptable to induce happiness in others, and
more acceptable to induce sadness, fear, disgust, and anger. In indi-
viduals with ASD, however, alexithymia did not predict moral ac-
ceptability judgments. This differential pattern of results suggests the
reliance on two different strategies when making judgments of moral
acceptability. This conclusion was supported by analyses comparing
the identification of emotion with moral acceptability judgments;
whereas the degree to which emotion identification was (a)typical
correlated with moral acceptability judgments in those without ASD,
these were uncorrelated in individuals with ASD. Although typical
Table 2
Correlations Between Moral Acceptability Ratings for the
Different Emotion categories
Emotion Happiness Sadness Fear Disgust
Full sample Sadness .085
Fear .659 .527
Disgust .228 .780 .603
Anger .528 .766 .797 .802
Control Sadness .299
Fear .816 .615
Disgust .438 .705 .665
Anger .719 .779 .907 .787
ASD Sadness .172
Fear .306 .469
Disgust .026 .826 .572
Anger .264 .766 .674 .819
Note. ASD  autism spectrum disorder.
 p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001.
Figure 1. Correlations between alexithymia and moral acceptability judgments for anger, disgust, fear,
happiness, and sadness-inducing statements in the control group. TAS-20 Toronto Alexithymia Questionnaire.
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individuals judged the moral acceptability of emotion-evoking state-
ments based on the emotion likely to be evoked, and alexithymia,
characterized by reduced emotion identification, negatively impacted
on this process, those with ASD did not rely on emotion judgments
when judging moral acceptability.
In line with the dual process model of morality, results indicated
that individuals with ASD base their moral judgments on factors other
than their emotional responses. Decreased reliance on emotion in
those with ASD is consistent with previous reports of reduced emo-
tional biases during decision-making in this population (Damiano,
Aloi, Treadway, Bodfish, & Dichter, 2012; De Martino, Harrison,
Knafo, Bird, & Dolan, 2008). These findings have been explained
within the context of a “two-systems” model of human judgment
(Evans, 2003), in which both intuitive and analytic processes interact.
Crucially, the intuitive process is subject to contextual emotional
information (Kahneman, 2003). Previous work has identified a role
for the amygdala in such emotionally biased decision-making (De
Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Kahneman & Freder-
ick, 2007), suggesting that decision-making in ASD is less subject to
emotional information due to reduced activation or connectivity of the
amygdala (De Martino et al., 2008). Within the context of moral
acceptability judgments, individuals with ASD may rely on learnt
social norms rather than emotional information, in line with evidence
that they rely more on rule-based than emotional rationales when
evaluating their own hypothetical prosocial behavior (Jameel, Vyas,
Bellesi, Cassell, & Channon, 2015). Alternatively, variance in under-
standing of causal relationships may predict moral judgments in ASD;
reduced understanding of the consequences of one’s actions may
cause some behaviors to be perceived as morally acceptable until
negative effects are observed.
Regarding the lack of a direct effect of ASD in moral reasoning, the
current task makes limited demands on theory of mind (ToM; repre-
senting others’ mental states). Moral reasoning may require ToM
when a victim is harmed mentally but not physically, or an agent’s
intention (e.g., to help) does not match the outcome of their behavior
(e.g., harming another; Moran et al., 2011). ToM deficits in ASD
(Happé, 1994) may cause atypical moral judgments in such situations,
particularly in individuals with more severe ToM impairments.
It should be noted that, although alexithymia is not a necessary
diagnostic criterion for ASD, diagnostic instruments often include
limited measures of emotional competence. This makes it crucial
to control for alexithymia when assessing the impact of ASD, and
Table 3
Regression Models Predicting Global Morality Score, (A) Including Age, Gender, Depression, and Anxiety in the First Step,
Alexithymia in the Second Step, and ASD Symptom Severity in the Third, (B) Including Demographic Variables in the First Step, ASD
Symptom Severity in the Second Step, and Alexithymia in the Third
Step Predictor
Control Global Morality score ASD Global Morality score
 p R2 R2 (p)  p R2 R2 (p)
A
1 Age .281 .190 30.0% 30.0% (.172) .086 .658 43.3% 43.3% (.018)
Gender .242 .305 .155 .558
Depression .333 .327 .325 .299
Anxiety .145 .687 .421 .081
2 Age .220 .157 65.8% 35.9% (.001) .092 .649 43.4% 0.1% (.841)
Gender .095 .579 .137 .634
Depression .097 .695 .321 .319
Anxiety .419 .168 .424 .088
Alexithymia .943 .001 .039 .841
3 Age .235 .154 66.2% 0.4% (.678) .116 .558 48.9% 5.4% (.183)
Gender .107 .551 .093 .740
Depression .075 .775 .296 .347
Anxiety .407 .195 .448 .068
Alexithymia .875 .008 .047 .815
ASD severity .101 .678 .257 .183
B
1 Age .281 .190 30.0% 30.0% (.172) .086 .658 43.3% 43.3% (.018)
Gender .242 .305 .155 .558
Depression .333 .327 .325 .299
Anxiety .145 .687 .421 .081
2 Age .332 .098 45.3% 15.3% (.050) .121 .529 48.7% 5.4% (.173)
Gender .245 .256 .076 .775
Depression .129 .687 .292 .340
Anxiety .001 .997 .450 .059
ASD severity .514 .050 .244 .173
3 Age .235 .154 66.2% 20.9% (.008) .116 .558 48.9% 0.2% (.815)
Gender .107 .551 .093 .740
Depression .075 .775 .296 .347
Anxiety .407 .195 .448 .068
ASD severity .101 .678 .257 .183
Alexithymia .875 .008 .047 .815
Note. ASD  autism spectrum disorder.
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for ASD when assessing the impact of alexithymia. The current
study measured ASD symptom severity in all participants using
the AQ. Although AQ correlates highly with other measures of
ASD severity (e.g., ADOS; Brugha et al., 2012), it is possible that
correlations with ASD symptom severity may vary with measure-
ment instrument. Finally, although we screened for ASD traits in
the typical sample using the AQ, future studies should confirm the
absence of ASD using the ADOS in the typical group.
In conclusion, these findings add to existing literature on alex-
ithymia and moral reasoning in nonclinical populations (Patil &
Silani, 2014a, 2014b), suggesting that difficulties in emotional
identification, and possibly empathy, not only alter responses to
others’ emotions, but also the emotions one elicits in others;
increased alexithymia may increase the tendency to cause distress
to others during social interactions. Moral behavior is crucial for
developing and maintaining social relationships, meaning atypical
moral judgments may add to the social difficulties experienced by
individuals with alexithymia. The differential results in typical and
ASD individuals suggest the relationship between alexithymia and
morality is complex, however. As alexithymia co-occurs with
several clinical conditions (Grynberg et al., 2012), it is necessary
to investigate this relationship across multiple populations. If alex-
ithymia predicts moral judgments in disorders, screening for alex-
ithymia may contribute to decreasing the proportion of individuals
with mental health issues currently in the criminal justice system.
Systematic examination of the role of alexithymia across a number
of clinical conditions is therefore warranted to fully characterize
moral reasoning in individuals with psychiatric conditions.
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Correction to Nickerson et al. (2014)
In the article “The Temporal Relationship Between Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Problem
Alcohol Use Following Traumatic Injury” by Angela Nickerson, J. Ben Barnes, Mark Creamer,
David Forbes, Alexander C. McFarlane, Meaghan O’Donnell, Derrick Silove, Zachary Steel, and
Richard A. Bryant (Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 2014, Vol. 123, No. 4, pp. 821–834.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0037920), the institutional affiliation in the author note for Alexander C.
McFarlane was incorrectly listed as Center for Military and Veterans’ Health, University of
Adelaide, rather than Centre for Traumatic Stress Studies, The University of Adelaide. The online
version of this article has been corrected.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/abn0000073
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